Alex Newhook’s trade to the Montreal Canadiens came as a surprise to observers both in La Belle Province and the Mile High State. Newhook was the one blue-chip prospect left in an Avalanche system gutted for the sake of making runs at Lord Stanley year after year, and although his second season had not gone as hoped, few expected Colorado to simply give up after two years. Likewise, Montreal, two years into a rebuild, was expected to prioritize draft capital over established players.
So when Kent Hughes pulled the trigger, many looked for ulterior motives for an explanation, as is often the case with unexpected transactions. Did Colorado realize that Newhook was a dud and cut him loose before his value tanked further? Did Montreal see something in Colorado’s assessment and development of the player that made him a buy-low candidate?
Who is Alex Newhook and what happened in Denver last year?
Part I: The Colorado Conundrum
A common knock against Newhook is that the sophomore forward was unable to seize an opportunity to cement himself within Colorado’s top six despite the team’s snowballing injury situation during the first half of the year. However, this criticism presupposes that 2022-23 Avalanche was built in the same mould as their Stanley Cup-winning predecessors from the year prior.
Colorado’s 2021-22 championship team was renowned for their interchangeable top two forward lines. Nathan MacKinnon, Mikko Rantanen, Valeri Nichushkin, Artturi Lehkonen, Gabriel Landeskog, and Nazem Kadri delivered elite-level play in virtually any combination and in any situation. Unfortunately, Landeskog’s career-threatening injury and Kadri’s departure for the Calgary Flames left the 2022-23 Avalanche with a mere quartet. Efforts to fill the gaps were only moderately successful: Evan Rodrigues and J.T. Compher had their positives but still paled in comparison to the remaining big four, let alone matching the missing Landeskog and Kadri. As such, instead of a top six and bottom six, Colorado, even when fully healthy, was largely forced to manage with a top three, a middle six, and a bottom three.
Colorado planned for this middle six to comprise one defence-minded and one offence-minded trio apiece, with ice-time and deployment preferences varying depending on the game situation. At the start of the season, Newhook was placed on the offensive unit while Compher anchored the defensive one. In practice however, as the offence-geared big four succumbed to injury after injury, replacement after replacement was pulled from Newhook’s trio rather than Compher’s — but Newhook himself never got the call. As a result, while Compher, Logan O’Connor, and Andrew Cogliano formed a stable third line throughout most of the first half of the season, Newhook’s partners during this time (marked as Phase II below) included Martin Kaut, Ben Meyers, a few games with Sampo Ranta, and one bizarre December day in Philadelphia when the Avalanche top line consisted of Newhook, Compher … and Charles Hudon.
That particular game in Philadelphia also marked a pivotal point in Newhook’s season — it was the game where MacKinnon suffered an injury that would keep him out of the lineup for the next four weeks. With only Rantanen left standing out of the big four, head coach Jared Bednar had to choose between elevating young Newhook to the top line or going with the veteran option in Compher. After prevaricating for a bit by playing Rantanen as a centre instead of a winger, Bednar chose Compher. This action drew a line, creating a distinct second and third line from what was an interchangeable middle six, and Newhook found himself below the threshold.
Did Compher outplay Newhook for this position? The numbers are inconclusive. From the start of the season to Compher’s ascension to top-line centre after game 28, Newhook — with eight points in ~349 minutes (1.38 P/60) — and Compher — with seven in ~375 minutes (1.12 P/60) — were neck-and-neck at 5-on-5. Compher pulled ahead with five power-play points to Newhook’s one, but also enjoyed the lion’s share of man-advantage time with the top unit. Ultimately, Compher’s seniority may have pushed him over the line. There are only so many situations that one can fill with a 20-year-old in his second year in the league.
However, Compher’s promotion created a headache for the Avalanche later on. Newhook was now the centre for the defence-oriented trio of himself, O’Connor, and Cogliano (Phase IV). While the Newfoundlander actually did quite well in this position, no one would mistake him for an elite shutdown centre — which prompted Colorado to acquire Lars Eller at the trade deadline.
Eller’s arrival effectively rendered Newhook homeless. He couldn’t play on the first line for obvious reasons, Compher had taken his spot on the second line, and Eller occupied his position on the third. Unsurprisingly, Newhook floundered during the home stretch (Phase V), bouncing around from Rodrigues and Compher to Matt Nieto and Denis Malgin, and periodically finding himself on the fourth line with Meyers. In fact, that’s where he finished the season, on the fourth line next to Meyers and Alex Galchenyuk.
A two-game stretch in early December neatly summarized Colorado’s dilemma with Newhook: on December 9, the forward was the top-line left winger alongside Rantanen and Nichushkin, tallying an assist as the Avalanche dropped a 2-1 shootout decision versus the New York Rangers. Two days later, Lehkonen’s return to the lineup dropped Newhook all the way to the fourth line against the St. Louis Blues, where he centred Hudon, Dryden Hunt, and Jean-Luc Foudy in a game where the team only dressed 11 forwards.
Part II: How did Newhook Perform?
The natural question then becomes: what, if anything, did Newhook do to warrant being bounced up and down the lineup? To examine this, we need to break up Newhook’s sophomore season into chunks based on his linemates and usage. Newhook’s 5-on-5 with-or-without-you (WoWY) numbers, combined with Colorado’s lineups throughout the year, give us four distinct categories to look at: with Rodrigues, with Compher, with O’Connor and Cogliano, and everything after the trade deadline.
Rodrigues, acquired on a one-year show-me deal as an unrestricted free agent during the off-season, was Newhook’s most common linemate. Newhook and Rodrigues were more or less inseparable for the first 35 or so games of the season, apart from the time when Rodrigues was out of the lineup with a lower-body injury in late November/early December.
However, it was not a good pairing.
Newhook’s personal production alongside Rodrigues, at 1.08 P/60, was well below his season’s average of 1.54 P/60. Shifting from personal to on-ice statistics, while the duo put up good possession numbers, it did not translate to goals. Newhook and Rodrigues were on the ice for nine goals for and 14 against — a differential of minus five. Newhook without Rodrigues had a goal differential of plus 10, while Rodrigues without Newhook enjoyed even greater success, with a goal differential of plus 14. However, it must be noted that the bulk of that number comes from Rodrigues’s time with MacKinnon.
Newhook’s time spent with Compher shows a very similar profile. After being separated from Rodrigues, Newhook and Compher were united for short several-game stretches intermittently throughout the remainder of the season. Newhook and Compher, like Newhook and Rodrigues, were a net negative in goal differential, while both Newhook and Compher enjoyed positive on-ice goal differentials apart from each other. To Compher’s credit, his plus 13 differential without Newhook was only partially driven by MacKinnon.
(For reference, Newhook and MacKinnon were together without either Rodrigues or Compher for ~30 minutes, with a goal differential of plus two.)
By contrast, Newhook’s time on what was supposed to be the checking line, with the least offensively adept linemates, turned out to be the most productive portion of his season (Phase III). Not only that, while the O’Connor-Newhook-Cogliano trio didn’t put up good possession numbers, they outscored their opposition 10 to two when all three were on the ice. This plus eight differential is probably a little bit luck driven, especially given the weakness of the underlying statistics. However, given the ~150 minute sample size, it’s undeniable that there was a chemistry for that trio that wasn’t there for Newhook when paired with Rodrigues or Compher.
Therein lies the problem. To get into the top six, Newhook would either have to play on the top line or play with two players with whom he had no chemistry. Perhaps it isn’t surprising then that Phase II and IV, the two stretches where he spent the least amount of time with Rodrigues and Compher, were Newhook’s most productive from an offensive standpoint.
Despite all of this, Newhook still managed to be the Avalanche’s fourth-best 5-on-5 point producer up to the end of March 4, two games past the trade deadline (and the end of Phase IV). With 1.65 P/60, Newhook sat in front of the likes of Rodrigues, Nichushkin, and Lehkonen — trailing only MacKinnon, Rantanen, and Compher.
March 4th also marked the end of Newhook’s two game stint with Compher and Rantanen after being displaced by Eller. Despite putting up three assists in those two games, Newhook became an afterthought in the Avalanche lineup. His production dropped accordingly from 1.65 to 1.28 P/60, yet that number was still higher than both Compher and Eller, the two players occupying Newhook’s potential roles in the lineup.
Part III: Top-Six Offence in Bottom-Six Situations?
It’s clear that an inability to gain traction alongside Compher or Rodrigues kept Newhook out of the top six. However, are these issues a question of personal incompatibility or a sign that Newhook wasn’t ready for the demands of second-line minutes? That’s not a question with a definitive answer.
We can point at Newhook’s success with Rantanen as an indicator that the sophomore could handle top-six responsibilities when alongside different players, but we can also wave that away by noting that MacKinnon and Rantanen make everyone else look good — which we’ve already explored, ironically enough, for Rodrigues and Compher themselves.
Likewise, we can also dismiss Newhook’s success with O’Connor and Cogliano as an indicator that Newhook can’t play with top skill against top skill, or we can take it as a sign of adaptability — of a skill player finding his groove as the go-to guy in more “grindy” minutes.
The interesting thing about Newhook is that his ability to produce with bottom-six players isn’t a one-year phenomenon. In 2021-22, the then-rookie also struggled with then-established third-liner Compher but excelled with lesser names such as Nicolas Aube-Kubel, Tyson Jost, and Nico Sturm.
A common denominator between Aube-Kubel, Jost, and Sturm in 21-22 and O’Connor and Cogliano in 22-23 is that Newhook’s personally scores more goals when playing with less-established bottom-six players. In fact, tallying both years together, Newhook’s goal-scoring rate almost doubles when he plays with such teammates.
One possibility for this trend is that there are two Newhooks depending on the situation — a deferential one who serves as a safety valve for more illustrious linemates, and a more aggressive one who knows that he is the offensive catalyst on a third or fourth line. Corey Sznajder’s All Three Zones tracking data gives some evidence for this hypothesis. If we compare Newhook’s microstats between 2021-22 and 2022-23, the rookie created more chances, generated more shots, and deflected more pucks than the sophomore. Moreover, Newhook was on the receiving end of many more one-timers during his inaugural full campaign.
By contrast, Newhook was far less of an offensive catalyst in year two, but did more of the dirty work. His defensive-zone puck-retrieval and zone-exit prowess improved dramatically, as did his ability to gain the offensive blue line with control through passing. This points at a player who helped his team transition from defence to offence, but generally took a back seat in the offensive zone to the likes of Rantanen, Nichushkin, Compher, and Rodrigues.
This hypothesis also aligns when looking at how Newhook’s skill set complemented his primary linemates in 2022-23. None of Rodrigues, Compher, O’Connor, or Cogliano exhibited defensive-zone puck-retrieval and zone-exit proficiency, none of them were particularly adept at gaining the offensive blue line with puck control, and all of them forechecked aggressively in contrast to Newhook’s more passive stance.
Unfortunately, A3Z tracking data sampling information is limited, so it’s not possible to obtain separate datasets for Newhook with O’Connor and Cogliano versus Newhook with Compher or Rodrigues. Nonetheless, Newhook’s flexibility and willingness to mould himself relative to his teammates is something to keep an eye on going forward.
Conclusion: What is Newhook, and why is he with the Canadiens?
Alex Newhook is, at present, not an ideal top-six player for a contending team. However, his sophomore slump shouldn’t be an indicator of stalled growth. While Colorado did give the youngster his chances to cement his role in the top six, they also gave him fewer opportunities than his competition. Despite no major statistical indication that Newhook performed better or worse than Compher or Rodrigues, it was the latter two who received the bulk of time with the big four (when healthy), whether at even strength or on the power play. Yet it was also those two who relied more heavily on the big four to prop up their numbers; Newhook put up the best goals-for percentage of the three when playing without any of the big four.
Ultimately, Newhook’s departure from the Mile High City is likely not an indicator of his own trajectory, but a consequence of team philosophy. As was the case last season, the Avalanche are still looking to replace Gabriel Landeskog and Nazem Kadri — and maybe even Valeri Nichushkin. Newhook won’t, and shouldn’t be expected to, hit those levels within the remaining years of Colorado’s window of contention, and Colorado can’t adequately shelter him as long as it remains a big four and not a big five.
According to Evan Liu, managing editor for Mile High Hockey, Newhook was “expected to be the second-line centre in 2022-23, and Bednar said that he was going to have the help and support that he needed. But the injury situation meant that Newhook got very little time at 2C, and was then forced into a lower, forechecking role which didn’t fit his game.”
The organization didn’t have the patience to wait — not for Newhook, and not for Rodrigues or Compher either, who were both allowed to walk away in free agency. Colorado’s off-season acquisition of Ryan Johansen indicates that general manager Chris MacFarland, for better or for worse, will be focused on short-term solutions for the immediate future.
That said, it’s probably a safe assumption that if Landeskog were healthy, Newhook would have spent the bulk of last season flanked by the Avalanche captain and Nichushkin, a vastly different prospect than what actually transpired, and a situation that probably would have earned the St. John’s native a new contract with the burgundy and blue.
Colorado’s misfortune is Montreal’s boon.
While Newhook and Kirby Dach are very different players, they share very similar situations. Both are high-ceiling players who hit development bumps due to circumstances beyond their control. Both showed glimmers of excellence under specific conditions and situations within campaigns that were, on the whole, below expectations. Most importantly, both showed the ability to learn and adapt to changing circumstances. Newhook pivoted between offensive driver and transition facilitator in Colorado, while Dach learned how to cycle and forecheck in his first year in Montreal.
There is ample reason to think that lightning could strike twice for Hughes.
All statistics, unless otherwise mentioned, sourced from Natural Stat Trick.
