A Flyers Lesson, Applied To The Canadiens
by Robert L on May 26, 2010 2:42 PM EDT
Email
Print
After allowing the shock of elimination to settle in for over 24 hours, can you say for yourself that you are any less stunned than than you were Monday night?
If you happened to see the televison cameras scan over at Hal Gill, standing long faced and simmering at the Montreal bench, immediately after the final siren, then perhaps you can that Gill looked, the way you felt inside.
The Flyers elimination of the Canadiens, who were favoured by many in the Eastern Conference final, was sudden, dismally abrupt and often times mystifying. A cruel and stilling fate few foresaw.
In letting mixed and confusing emotions marinade over the past day in search of some clarity, I found myself thinking much more about the Flyers past than the Canadiens present. I didn't consider the Canadiens large favorites in the round and I also didn't see either team as being much more superior than the other. That it was curtain time after five games, cheated what looked to be a better matchup and a longer series.
After thinking it over, I'll say this: The Flyers were greatly underestimated by many (yours truly included). They were greatly underestimated moreso than the post-season Montreal miracle machine.
Admittedly, my perception of Philly was based on their regular season and not on their potential. That cleared up, I now totally understand why and how they acheived the final, and that they are deserving of being there.
What cleared that mental hurdle for me, were thoughts going back to the past three off-seasons for Philadelphia and some bold strokes made by GM Paul Holmgren that had many in the hockey world either shaking their heads in disbelief or bewildered by his brash audacity.
When my thoughts turned to where the Canadiens should take this season and its accomplishments into the summer, I was reminded of the Flyers off season moves in which bold strokes were made to define and solidify the club's identity.
On June 18, 2007, Holmgren acquired the rights to impending free agents Scott Hartnell and Kimmo Timmonen from Nashville in return for the first round pick Philly had acquired in the Peter Forsberg trade, plus future considerations. With less than 10 days left before free agent season opened, Holmgren signed Hartnell to a six year deal that averaged out at $4.2M per year and Timmonen for the same term at $6.33M per annum.
The trade and subsequent signing were so brilliant, sneaky and ballsy, conspiracy theories abounded. Not only was there controversy, but it threw the Flyers well over the salary cap.
Fast forward to June 26, 2009, the day of the NHL entry draft in Montreal. Rumours had been swirling that Anaheim defensemen Chris Pronger was about to be dealt somewhere. He was heading into the final season of a contract that paid him $6.2M.
Midway through the first round of the draft, NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman stepped to the podium to announce a trade. I recall it well because I was there.
A crescendo of excitement spread like a wave throught the Bell Centre, as fans in Montreal likely assumed the deal involved the Habs, as their pick was approaching. The buzz was all about Vincent Lecavalier, and it was very real, and very close to happening.
But it was not to be.
Pronger was traded by Anaheim to the Flyers with Ryan Dingle for forward Joffrey Lupul, defenseman Luca Sbisa, Philadelphia's 1st round choices in the 2009 and 2010 Entry Drafts and future considerations.
It was another Philly stunner, as it sacrificed tons of future assets for standing in the present tense. Again, it pushed the Flyers over the cap, and made even less sense considering Pronger was an impending free agent. They have since signed him to a four year extension that comes in at about $7.2M.
So here's the thing. The Flyers were able to identify the available players that they wanted and did what they needed to do to secure them. They sacrificed potential assets, present and future, in order to group together a team of players that could reach for the Stanley Cup in short order.
They have risked greatly in swinging for the fences, but they are now in the Cup final with a kick at the can. In the present tense, little else matters. To summon a lyric from a Tragically Hip tune, "no one is interested in something you didn't do."
The long and short of it is that the Flyers, doormats just a few seasons back, realitzed that opportunity in the salary cap era of the NHL represents a very small window of time. So, caution to the wind, they went for broke.
The worst case scenario should they swing and miss, is that in a few seasons, they begin at square one again, rewarded with high draft picks that could bring franchise players into the fold.
Now this lesson applies to the Canadiens in a contrary scenario. Approaching this off-season, many of the Canadiens desirables, they already own.
Tomas Plekanec and Dominic Moore are unrestricted free agents. So is Glen Metropolit. The restricted free agents on the team start with goaltenders Jaroslav Halak and Carey Price, and include forwards Maxim Lapierre, Sergei Kostitsyn, Benoit Pouliot and Tom Pyatt.
Now the sooner the better, but before July 1 the Canadiens should sign up each and every NHL commodity they want going forward. Give market value to Halak, Plekanec, Moore and Price before July kicks in, in order to retain assets.
If trade scenarios need to be worked out for certain players, it is easier to achieve when a player has a defined salary attached to his future. If they can do this before the draft in June, and before July 1, it would empower their own trade potential at each pivotal time.
In the summer of 2009, the Canadiens allowed ten players of interest to walk with no return. Logic made such a purge sensible with the notion the Canadiens would replenish those losses from the free agent pool, and they struck paydirt, signing the likes of Mike Cammalleri, Brian Gionta, Hal Gill, Jaroslav Spacek, Travis Moen and Paul Mara.
Now, imagine if the Canadiens brass had been visionary enough to the point of gaining an asset or two by virtue of the resigning and trading of players such as Saku Koivu, Alex Tanguay, Alex Kovalev, Mike Komisarek, Robert Lang or Chris Higgins.
Any asset returned would have been a bonus.
The Flyers have made the most of current NHL rules by undertsanding that the salary cap and its constraints are not in effect between May and October.
That is like infiltrating rocket science thinking with the rock, paper, scissors inevitability.
The Canadiens would do well to do the same, mimicking the Flyers off-season daring, while retaining every possible asset prior to July 1st.
There are win/win scenarios, and this one is a can't lose/can't lose deal.
Not retaining valuable assets while salary cap constraints are not in play is reckless.
So sign away, and retain assets.
What is there to lose?
13 comments
|
0 recs |
Do you like this story?
Comments
That would not have been visionary, it would have been disastrous had the Habs re-signed Koivu, Kovalev, Tanguay etc. The only ones who signed immediately were Kovalev and Komisarek, there was little market for Koivu, Lang and Tanguay.
If Gainey signed all of those players and could not unload them, then this team would have been stuck to the core that it had already decided to divest itself from. You also outline the Fllyers vision in dealing for Hartnell and Timonen, yet both of these players were unsigned when they did it, showing that their value was not linked to their signing.
The Flyers have made bold moves, but outright theft and strong drafting has built their core.
They stole Coburn from Atlanta. They stole Carle from Tampa. They stole Leino from the Wings. All trades that the instant they were made left me shaking my head at how Holmgren did it. All young players that when added to a youthful core of Richards, Carter and Giroux assure a strong future.
They can afford to toss aside a Lupul and two first rounders because of this young core to supplement it with Pronger. They are in no danger of collapsing after this Cup run, this team is loaded for the future. Their achillies heel is the trio of Emery, Boucher and Leighton. It will haunt them in the Finals at some point.
I agree that Halak will be easier to deal with a number affixed to him, but that is because he has arbitration rights. It will not change Price’s trade value or any of their younger core as long as they are not drastically overpaid.
That would not have been visionary, it would have been disastrous had the Habs re-signed Koivu, Kovalev, Tanguay etc. The only ones who signed immediately were Kovalev and Komisarek, there was little market for Koivu, Lang and Tanguay.
Not all, but maybe one or two of the impending free agents could have been dealt signed or unsigned to get some kinda return. It can’t be said that they had no value whatsoever when Montreal managed to get something for Steve Begin.
If Koivu and Tanguay signed before July 1st, do you think they would have received only $3M and $2.5M, the numbers both received? Tanguay wasn’t signed until September. Koivu and Kovalev a week into Free Agency.
You are re-writing history here. Gainey’s whole philosophy was to use the UFA years as motivation, he also wanted to see how they would respond to the pressure. When he didn’t like what he saw, it opened up the door to ditch the core and remake it. Something that lead to the acquistion of most of the players who were stars in this Conference Finals run.
In order to compare them to Begin, Gainey would have needed to make the call on all of them in March of 2009. Trading Koivu, Komisarek, Kovalev etc when they were in 5th place would have been ridiculous considering that they had won the Conference the season before.
If he re-signed them after the season to trade them, he would have had to deal them in June before teams had signed any free agents. Seeing as only one of the players you suggested he could trade were signed on July 1st (Komisarek), it would have been unlikely that he could unload even half of them by July 1st, so bye bye Cammalleri, GIonta, Gill etc.
I don’t understand the reasoning when one of your examples is Hartnell and Timonen, both unsigned players who were dealt for a 1st rounder. Higgins also wasn’t signed and was able to be dealt in a package with prospects for Gomez. Players like Price, Pouliot, Pyatt and Halak do not need to be signed in order to return value because they are RFAs, their rights will remain with whoever they trade them to.
The only player that is worrisome this summer is Plekanec.
by Chris Boyle on May 27, 2010 10:01 AM EDT up reply actions
Maybe your misreading my intentions all the way through here. There’s no re-writing of history in any sense, because the opinions I have now were indeed thoughts that I had at the time.
I get what the purge of players was all about and why Gainey sought to clean house, but what I am suggesting is that one or two players from that group could have been signed at any point beforehand and traded at a later date. As a means to maximize returns on assets, it would not have been foolharded nor would it have diminished potential scenarios.
The bottom line, and the entire point, is that there is no cap in place during the off season, and that is what the Flyers worked in the two scenarios I mention.
I’m not making a player or scenario comparison to Begin, I was simply stating that case to show that a return on better players was there to be had.
Trading Koivu, Komisarek, Kovalev etc when they were in 5th place would have been ridiculous considering that they had won the Conference the season before.
I never advocated trading anyone when the season was still underway. It is between the end of the season and the beginning of free agency that these scenarios possibly could have been acted upon.
If he re-signed them after the season to trade them, he would have had to deal them in June before teams had signed any free agents. Seeing as only one of the players you suggested he could trade were signed on July 1st (Komisarek), it would have been unlikely that he could unload even half of them by July 1st, so bye bye Cammalleri, GIonta, Gill etc.
Not neccessarily so. Gainey could have traded them at any point thereafter. It would not have compromised who he signs on July because the cap is not in play. Additionally, it would have given Gainey an extra card to play in regards to the teams that came up empty in the free agent hunt, provided of course that the signed deals would not have included restricting no movement clauses.
I don’t understand the reasoning when one of your examples is Hartnell and Timonen, both unsigned players who were dealt for a 1st rounder.
The reasoning is merely to point out that the scenarios can be worked in other senses. The Canadiens can trade away unsigned player rights and get a return, they can also be daring and acquire the rights to potential free agents, sign them at this point in time, salary cap be damned, and sort it out over the summer.
The only player that is worrisome this summer is Plekanec
.
Absolutely, but should signing him up quickly negate another scenario, such as the availability of Patrick Marleau to Montreal in one fashion or another?
Also
I am not even sure you can trade a player unless it is a sign and trade deal.
In the NBA you can only sign and trade a player if a deal is already worked out. If you sign a player, you must keep him for 3 months minimum before dealing him. Not sure how the NHL deals with this matter.
If the same rules apply, the Habs would have had to either deal them all on deadline day or work out sign a trade deals with the Sens, Ducks, Lightning. An unlikely scenario.
by Chris Boyle on May 27, 2010 10:23 AM EDT up reply actions
I am not even sure you can trade a player unless it is a sign and trade deal.
A player’s rights can be dealt, conditionally or unconditionally, up until the moment those rights expire on July 1. With the Sundin rights trade to Montreal a few seasons back as reference, the trade can be spelled out in whatever manner the two parties agree to. The return can depend on, or not depend upon, a potential signing. In the Sundin case, it was dependant. In the case of the Hartnell/Timmonen deal, it was not.
If the same rules apply, the Habs would have had to either deal them all on deadline day or work out sign a trade deals with the Sens, Ducks, Lightning. An unlikely scenario.
Now maybe you’re being the revisionist here, as these scenarios were inexistant at the time of the trade deadline that season, and were out of play by the time such players signed with their eventual suitors as Montreal’s right to them expired July 1st.
Who knows where Koivu, Kovalev, Komisarek, Tanguay, et al, could have been bound for between the end of the season, and July 1 when the Canadiens lost their rights to them, but Gainey did manage to maximize the Higgins asset with the Rangers. He was also using that, the McDonagh and Plekanec rights (perhaps more as has been rumoured) to levarage the Lecavalier deal.
What it all comes down to is, were there not workable sign and trade scenarios for Gainey to act upon. The Leafs made their interest in Komisarek very well known, through Burke being the Team USA GM and almost blatantly tampering with Komi outright through newspaper reports.
Komi shopped himself to Boston before settling for the same money Montreal offered with Toronto. Could Gainey not have gotten a return on that potential trade and sign with the Leafs, knowing his stand on Komisarek before July 1, and considering the Maple Leafs exposed eagerness to jump on him?
Toronto/ Burke were already dangling first rounders and Kaberle in hopes of landing Kessel at that point in time.
Could Bob maybe have worked something there, because when the Leafs grabbed Komi on July 1, I practically shit myself at the obviousness of that matchup, given the rumoured reports. While Habs fans thought it unthinkable that Komi sign there, I never saw it as unrealistic.
Gainey should have seen that one coming. Komi was a player sitting on the fence in regards to his resigning with Montreal. After losing both Souray and Streit for squat, you would think he could come up with some sort or return.
Sundin was traded BEFORE he was signed. It has no bearing on anything I said. That deal was a parallel to the Timmonen deal. You are suggesting that the Habs sign the players THEN deal them.
You are creating scenarios in which the Canadiens have ZERO leverage in order to return prospects or picks. Why would Komisarek sign a deal with Montreal to hasten a trade with Toronto when he can just sign there immediately and not weaken the Leafs in anyway. Why would he accept a deal BEFORE he understands what his value will be on July 1st? You are thinking of this in a scenario in which all the parties involved have the Canadiens best interest at heart, when in reality players go to July 1st on the hopes of inflating their worth.
In your scenario the Canadiens can go way over the cap and then just trade players away for assets.
In addition, from July 1 to the last day of training camp, teams may exceed the Upper Limit by no more than 10%. For 2008-09, the absolute highest teams can go during the offseason (from July 1 to the end of training camp) is $62.37 million. Players who finished the prior season on LTIR are excluded for the purpose of offseason calculations.
So that means the Canadiens could have gone over by $5M. Let’s say the resigned all their players that you listed to their 2010 numbers. Kovalev (5M), Koivu (3M), Tanguay (2.5M), Komisarek (4.5M), Lang (1M) equals 16M. I removed Higgins because he was traded for Gomez pre July 1st.
Add in the players already signed + the RFA’s they needed to sign and the Canadiens were already at 35.5M. So that would put the Habs at 51M. If they could not unload those players, how would they pay the $20M+ on the new core? That would put their Cap number at $71M meaning the NHL would reject $10M worth of those contracts.
This is not a realistic scenario. No team is going to pony up picks for players they can acquire a week into free agency when they see if their 1st option is available. Komisarek is the only guy who could have possibly been flipped this way. Koivu, Kovalev, Lang and Tanguay were signed well after July 1st with Tanguay going all the way to September.
There was no worth in the majority of the Habs UFA’s in 2009 once they passed the deadline.
Sundin was traded BEFORE he was signed. It has no bearing on anything I said. That deal was a parallel to the Timmonen deal. You are suggesting that the Habs sign the players THEN deal them.
I’ve suggested the scenario both ways, trading the signed or unsigned, and trading for the unsigned, as in the Philly deal for Hartnell and Timmonen.
You are creating scenarios in which the Canadiens have ZERO leverage in order to return prospects or picks
Not really. They have leverage if they trade a player, signed or unsigned. By doing neither, they then have zero leverage.
Why would Komisarek sign a deal with Montreal to hasten a trade with Toronto when he can just sign there immediately and not weaken the Leafs in anyway.
This statement assumes Komisarek would know Gainey’s plans. Why on earth would Gainey inform Komisarek of his ulterior intentions? Why would he be made wise to it. For all Komisarek would know, he’s signed to the Habs for a few years, then traded.
Why would he accept a deal BEFORE he understands what his value will be on July 1st?
It is a chance he takes. There were two stories floating here on this signing. One is that Komi’s offer from Montreal was the same, as per Gainey. As per Komi, he did not receive an offer from Montreal.
Regardless, if Gainey is not intent on keeping Komisarek, trade his negotiation rights somewhere between June 1 and July 1and get something in return.
You are thinking of this in a scenario in which all the parties involved have the Canadiens best interest at heart, when in reality players go to July 1st on the hopes of inflating their worth.
Not at all. You seem to think players are privy to Gainey’s plan when they hardly are at all. Not in my scenario.
It’s very simple. Gainey finds a team that is interested in one of his players. He determines if said team would trade for that player’s negotiations rights or would prefer to part with a particular asset for the player to come signed. The team acquiring sets a number, Gainey signs the player if player agrees on that number (never knowing the destination), and Gainey comes out with an asset.
In your scenario the Canadiens can go way over the cap and then just trade players away for assets.
Players who finished the prior season on LTIR are excluded for the purpose of offseason calculations.
I’ve never said anything about going WAY over the cap. You seem to want to intone that I’m suggested EVERYBODY be resigned. I’m talking about finding one such scenario to profit from.
In regards to the LITR, both Markov and Lang finished the season on it, so the number would drop, not that it would have mattered.
Let’s say they resigned all their players that you listed to their 2010 numbers.
WHY ALL? I’m talking about finding one scenario!
This is not a realistic scenario. No team is going to pony up picks for players they can acquire a week into free agency when they see if their 1st option is available.
It can be envisioned that teams could potentially part with assets, in a sign and trade, or simply for negotiating rights. Teams are competing with one another on July 1 and gaining and edge in a negotiation is worth something.
Again, the player is never privy, unless the priveldge of speaking is granted to team and agent.
There was no worth in the majority of the Habs UFA’s in 2009 once they passed the deadline.
Technically not, because the deadline has passed, but come summer, leading up to July 1 there is all kinds of worth.
11 of 12 players cut loose by Montreal on July found NHL contracts. Not one of them was capitalized upon.
It was a terrible mismanagement of assets. Gainey could have found at least one scenario that worked something back.
Go back and look at the last 6 years of UFAs and find how many returned assets after the trade deadline. Sundin, Timonen, Hartnell, Bouwmeester, Reinprecht, Malone a handful more. We are talking about 1-2% of UFAs since the lockout that have been dealt between February and July 1st. There were 5 days of player signings before Kovalev and Koivu signed and Tanguay and Lang were on the market until September.
You indicate all types of worth, yet the actual market would indicate otherwise.
Too much can go wrong in your scenario. You could misjudge the players worth and overpay them before the market dictates worth (nobody thought Tanguay was taking a $2.5M paycut or Lang a $3M haircut on July 1st) rendering them tough to deal. You could earn a bad reputation for signing a guy under false pretenses and dealing him weeks later. You could miss out on other UFA’s because of the $62M cap limit, you could also get an RFA poached if another GM sees you up against the $62M and offers a reasonable raise that you cannot match. All of this risk to get a couple of mid level draft picks. High risk/low reward, no thanks.
I will agree to disagree that it is a terrible mismanagement of assets.
Go back and look at the last 6 years of UFAs and find how many returned assets after the trade deadline. Sundin, Timonen, Hartnell, Bouwmeester, Reinprecht, Malone a handful more.
I readily admit it does not happen often, but it’s that type of against the grain, break the mold, outside the box thinking that I believe is required on the occasion of unique circumstances, last year being one of those times.
I do not recall the Reinprecht scenario, but the Sundin case never panned out as we all recall. The Philly, Tampa and Calgary deals were very unique from one another. The Flyers took advantage of a market too small too retain its assets. Calgary attempted to do the same, likely paying more for Bou than they needed to – he would have signed there anyway, and the Penguins managed to get something for a player demanding too much increase for their budget. Onus on Tampa in that one for pursuing Malone.
You indicate all types of worth, yet the actual market would indicate otherwise.
Not “all types” – I was never that specific. To lay it out now, let’s say I was meaning draft picks beyond the first round. The market indicated there was a market, nothing more.
Too much can go wrong in your scenario. You could misjudge the players worth and overpay them before the market dictates worth (nobody thought Tanguay was taking a $2.5M paycut or Lang a $3M haircut on July 1st) rendering them tough to deal.
Misjudging a player’s worth happens every July 1st, but until a player signs somewhere, that is the agent’s bluff. Often a player is worth more to one franchise than to another (Streit) but that doesn’t neccessarily imply that one team overpaid. The inexplicable Souray deal with Edmonton is a whole other ball of wax. I don’t put much emphasis on market dictating worth. Players and greedy agents, and domino scenarios filiing team needs can bring a player’s worth up or down. Where one team’s market can afford more than another’s doesn’t always suggest a player has an established value. Kovalev waited five days to increase his Habs offer with Ottawa when there surely wouldn’t have been a single other team in the league that would have equally the initial offer.
As for Tanguay and Lang, they got what they deserved. Tanguay bailed on Montreal in the playoffs – I’m surprised he signed anywhere. Lang’s specific type of injury, and age, pretty much dictated a low risk salary earned as a camp walk on.
You could earn a bad reputation for signing a guy under false pretenses and dealing him weeks later.
You are dead on right here, but for it to become “reputation” a GM would have to do it more than once. One case doesn’t make a blanket assessment.
You could miss out on other UFA’s because of the $62M cap limit.
Prioritizing would eliminate this. A GM decides who he prefers. They do not get to have everyone they want.
You could also get an RFA poached if another GM sees you up against the $62M and offers a reasonable raise that you cannot match.
This statement implies that a team is capped out even before July 1. You’re inventing a scenario that does not, and could not exist, to make a point. You mentioned earlier about the trading of UFA’s amounting to maybe 1 or 2% of all scenarios, this one is even less likely.
All of this risk to get a couple of mid level draft picks.
Still, I don’t see risk in a sign and trade scenario of a player coming or going. I see it as minimizing the risk of getting nothing for a player departing or a way of assuring you get first shot at a desired player about to hit the market.
The worst case scenario in either case is nothing more than striking out.
There are three reasons why philly is in the finals
1.)The east literally played a version of the tune "The World Turned Upside Down".
Montreal beat the Caps. Boston beat Buffalo and Philly continued their curb stomp of the Devils (at least in regards to this year).The only team to come out of the quarters in decent shape was Pittsburgh; and everyone knows how their next series worked out for them.
In D.C., there was a belief, that regards of series progression; that the caps were gonna beat the Habs and then flip on a dime and whip the crap outta the Flyers .It didnt happen.
2.)At this juncture, the Flyers have nothing to lose. the NHL’s current playoff slogan is "history will be made". If that slogan doesn’t signify Philly; what does?
3.)By the time the Habs recognized the importance of urgency-the third period horn went off and Montreal writers went into the post mortem of what to finally make of this team’s year.
so yeah, what the Flyers are doing is special. However they played with urgency (with the clear exception of game 3) and depending on how one views it-they played with some semblance of momentum.
i come in peace (and for wingdings)
If the Flyers lose they will just be a footnote in history like the 81/91 Northstars, the 82 Canucks, the 03 Ducks, 04 Flames and 06 Oilers.
by Chris Boyle on May 27, 2010 10:03 AM EDT up reply actions
I’m not sure I’d use the Flyers as a model franchise. They’re really not that great — far and away the weakest of the three clubs the Habs face this postseason, and I expect, easy prey for the Hawks. I’ve never bought into the notion of the Flyers as an elite club, and still don’t.
They’re very much like the Habs actually: a mediocre 5-on-5 club that makes its hay on special teams. As we know from watching the Habs, that doesn’t really amount to much in the long run.
Comments For This Post Are Closed
Secondary Sidebar
User Tools
Related FanPosts on Habs Eyes On The Prize
Related FanShots on Habs Eyes On The Prize
FanPosts
Community blog posts and discussion.
Recent FanPosts
Certain photos copyright © 2012 by Associated Press or Getty Images. Any commercial use or distribution without the express written consent of Associated Press and Getty Images is strictly prohibited.
